Busting the Professional Trust: A Comment on William Simon\u27s Ladd Lecture by Wendel, W. Bradley
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 4 Article 3
2003
Busting the Professional Trust: A Comment on
William Simon's Ladd Lecture
W. Bradley Wendel
wbw@wbw.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
W. B. Wendel, Busting the Professional Trust: A Comment on William Simon's Ladd Lecture, 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2003) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol30/iss4/3
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
BUSTING THE PROFESSIONAL TRUST:  
A COMMENT ON WILLIAM SIMON'S LADD LECTURE 
 
W. Bradley Wendel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 30 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMER 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 4
 
Recommended citation: W. Bradley Wendel, Busting the Professional Trust: A Comment on 
William Simon's Ladd Lecture, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659 (2003).  
659 
BUSTING THE PROFESSIONAL TRUST: A 
COMMENT ON WILLIAM SIMON’S LADD LECTURE 
W. BRADLEY WENDEL* 
 I.  ...................................................................................................................... 660 
 II.  ...................................................................................................................... 663 
 III.  ...................................................................................................................... 673 
 
 It is truly an honor to be asked to Comment on the work of Wil-
liam Simon, one of the scholars who has done the most to contribute 
to the reputation of legal ethics as a field with intellectual rigor and 
depth, as well as one with significant implications for legal theory 
generally. The power of his critical faculties is unmatched: the plati-
tudes offered by the organized bar in defense of the dominant view of 
legal ethics lie in tatters after the sustained assault in the first three 
chapters of The Practice of Justice.1 In fact, it can be difficult to find 
objections to the dominant view that Simon has not already articu-
lated more forcefully. But his project is not merely critical, as his 
construction of the alternative contextual view of ethics shows. His 
Mason Ladd Lecture is a welcome extension of the contextual view, 
moving from the micro-evaluation of the ethics of individual lawyers 
into the macro level of institutional analysis and questions of regula-
tory regime design. Section I of this Comment is a brief review of this 
proposal.  
 Simon’s work has been a tremendous influence on my own think-
ing about legal ethics,2 so I have good reason to fear the ignominious 
fate of commentators who end up agreeing with the subject of their 
evaluation. Indeed there is a great deal in this Lecture to agree with. 
Some of his suggestions for reform are so far-reaching, however, that 
one is bound to have a few reservations and questions. Section II of 
this Comment contains some questions about the details of using a 
market-based approach and a diversity of ethical norms to regulate 
lawyers. Simon has anticipated many of these objections, none of 
which are likely fatal to his project, but some of which seem to be a 
bit more problematic than he acknowledges. For example, even if a 
                                                                                                                    
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I am grateful to An-
drew Perlman for comments on this Comment and to Rob Atkinson for the invitation to 
submit it.  
 1. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 1-
76 (1998). 
 2. In this I am not alone. See David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A 
Comment on Simon, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 255, 255 (1996); David B. Wilkins, In Defense 
of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 271 (1996). The fact that Luban and Wilkins, two other writers 
who have influenced me enormously, also cite Simon as an influence makes me doubly cau-
tious in this critical undertaking. 
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sufficient number of clients desire to hire high commitment lawyers, 
the transaction costs involved in matching up high commitment law-
yers and clients may be sufficiently high to thwart the operation of 
the reputational market Simon envisions. Section III takes issue 
with the argument that nonlegal methods of regulation can avoid the 
corruption of regulation by self-interested professionals. Although 
nonlegal regulation offers many advantages over a formal scheme of 
legally enforceable rules, it is no less susceptible to capture by power-
ful actors than a system of legal regulation.  
I. 
 There are two interrelated proposals in Simon’s Lecture: The first 
is to consider additional sources of legal regulation of lawyers, such 
as courts and legislatures in addition to bar associations, which tend 
to become corrupted by the economic self-interest of lawyers.3 Insti-
tutions not under the control of lawyers have a better record of look-
ing out for the interests of non-clients, and once these other institu-
tions have articulated different norms of lawyering, there is a chance 
they may catch on more widely. For example, the response of the Of-
fice of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to the law firms that assisted Lincoln 
Savings focused the attention of many in the profession and the 
academy on the justification for strenuously partisan norms of 
lawyering in the context of counseling and advising clients.4 Even if 
the OTS’s approach did not ultimately carry the day, the debate was 
useful. Thus, there is an intrinsic value in a diversity of normative 
approaches to lawyering, provided there is some way for regulators 
or lawyers themselves to select among them. 
 Another way to diversify the legal norms that may potentially be 
applicable to lawyers is to free states from the American Bar Asso-
ciation’s (ABA) monopoly on the drafting of disciplinary rules.5 The 
hope is that one or more states may seek to establish a reputation for 
regulatory norms that are more protective of third-party interests 
than the current crop of ABA models, including those recently pro-
posed by the Ethics 2000 Commission. But why would a state do this, 
if the lawyers who control the organized bar have a selfish interest in 
limiting the protections offered by the rules to third parties? Here is 
where Simon’s second proposal comes in: namely, to rely on informal, 
decentralized mechanisms of social control to do some of the work 
currently entrusted to formal legal regimes.6 There is a certain irony 
                                                                                                                    
 3. William H. Simon, Who Needs the Bar?: Professionalism Without Monopoly, 30 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 639, 639-40 (2003).  
 4. Id. at 640. 
 5. Id. at 648. 
 6. Id. at 652-54. The contrast between “formal” and “informal” methods of regulation 
and “legal” and “nonlegal” regulation is intended to track the usage of these terms in 
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here, because the talk of markets, “reputation bonds,” and mecha-
nisms for reducing information costs that inevitably attends this 
kind of proposal relies, at its root, on the self-interest of the contract-
ing parties. It is almost as though Simon’s idealistic side hopes that 
states, freed from the ABA’s regulatory monopoly, will aspire to rules 
that reflect a greater commitment to protecting third party interests, 
while his realistic side acknowledges the pervasiveness of market 
rhetoric and economic self-interest among lawyers,7 and has there-
fore tailored a proposal for reform that takes these realities into ac-
count. In the end, however, Simon’s market-based mechanism may 
be just as susceptible to corruption by the self-interest of lawyers as 
the formal, profession-based scheme of regulation that is the target 
of the critique in this Lecture.  
 It is important to clarify the usage of the term “professional mo-
nopoly” in the Lecture. Three different senses of the term crop up, 
and as a result Simon’s arguments against the professional monopoly 
can occasionally be inconsistent. One is that the profession seeks a 
regulatory monopoly vis-à-vis anything that can plausibly be charac-
terized as “providing legal services.” Simon is right that there is no 
principled distinction between, say, tax planning as performed by a 
lawyer and by an accountant, so we have reason to be suspicious of 
this aspect of the professional monopoly.8 A second sense of monop-
oly, though, exists within the profession, because each state main-
tains a monopoly over the practice of law within its borders, enforced 
through prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law.9 The noto-
rious Birbrower10 case showed the expansive definition of practicing 
law within a state that may be articulated by an ambitious state 
aiming to protect local practitioners from out-of-state competition. 
Simon is again correct that it is almost impossible to draw principled 
lines here.11 Corporate lawyers in New York interpret Delaware law 
all the time, so the source of law cannot be dispositive. Physical pres-
ence is not only an illegitimate proxy for the source of law, as Simon 
notes,12 but an anachronistic standard given the prevalence of tech-
                                                                                                                    
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
Ellickson’s study of cattle ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California, showed that 
residents of this rural county relied on informal norms of neighborliness, not formal legal 
entitlements, as the starting point for bargaining to settle issues such as cattle trespasses 
and boundary fence disputes. 
 7. Simon, supra note 3, at 5, at 653; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Professor Simon on 
the Kaye Scholer Affair: Shock at the Gambling at Rick’s Place in Casablanca, 23 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 323, 324 (1998). 
 8. Simon, supra note 3, at 644.  
 9. Id. at 641-44. 
 10. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 2-3 
(Cal. 1998). 
 11. Simon, supra note 3, at 645-47.  
 12. Id. at 644-45. 
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nology that facilitates interactions between lawyers and clients. And 
finally, there is no reason to suspect that resident lawyers are more 
competent that out-of-state lawyers, particularly since the law has 
such a marked tendency toward national uniformity, with local 
quirks being just that: quirks that can easily be mastered by an out-
of-state lawyer. This leads to the third sense of professional monop-
oly as used in the Lecture, “monopolistic federalism,”13 which is an-
other way of referring to the hegemonic effect of disciplinary rules 
drafted by the ABA and the ALI’s Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers.14 Those two sources of regulatory norms exert so much in-
fluence that it is difficult to find much variation among states in the 
legal restrictions they place on lawyers.  
 Actually, one might quibble with the last claim. Some rules vary 
quite a bit among the states, and one of the provisions of the ABA 
Model Rules that most directly implicates the protection of non-
clients, the scope of exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, is the 
one on which the diversity of state variation is the most pronounced. 
The rules supplement I use in my professional responsibility course 
even contains an elaborate chart, prepared by an insurer of large law 
firms, which details each state’s rules on the confidentiality rule and 
its exceptions.15 Nitpicking aside, though, Simon’s “competitive fed-
eralism” proposal is worth thinking carefully about. The heart of the 
programmatic portion of the Lecture is a celebration of polycentric 
regulation, from a diversity of state-based licensing approaches to a 
range of private mechanisms through which lawyers can signal their 
levels of ethical commitment, letting the market take over some of 
the task of post-admissions monitoring of lawyers’ conduct. I will 
concentrate on the second (and least developed) of these proposals, 
which is the most radical in its challenge to the regulatory monopoly 
of the organized bar. 
 In Simon’s view, the current disciplinary rules, at least in the 
ABA’s model version, articulate a low commitment standard of ethics 
in the sense of sacrificing legitimate interests of third parties, and 
the substantive justice of a matter, to the interests of lawyers and 
clients.16 The classic example is the strict rule against disclosing any 
                                                                                                                    
 13. Id. at 649. 
 14. The inconsistency in the attack on the professional monopoly is between the objec-
tions to the second and third definitions of monopoly. If the Birbrower decision is objec-
tionable because the practice of law is essentially national in scope anyway, because of the 
increasing homogenization of the law itself, as well as the nationwide uniformity in legal 
education and bar examinations, then it seems to make sense to regulate lawyers on a na-
tional basis as well. 
 15. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT app. A (2001), reprinted in THOMAS D. 
MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
134 (2002). 
 16. Simon, supra note 3, at 652. 
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information relating to the representation of a client even if its dis-
closure would avert a major financial catastrophe to a third party;17 
but one could cite many others. Adversarial discovery practice, the 
norms governing deception in negotiations, the permissibility of con-
fidentiality agreements in settlements (particularly in products li-
ability cases), and settlement patterns in class actions are all areas 
in which the current law governing lawyers protects the self-interest 
of lawyers while imposing substantial externalities on non-clients. As 
a result of the indifference of the organized bar to the costs to third 
parties of the strongly role-differentiated adversary system, lawyers 
have forfeited the trust and respect of the public.18 Hence the double 
meaning inherent in the title of this Comment: the bar has bank-
rupted its reserves of public trust, so it is now time to play Teddy 
Roosevelt and break up the power of this group to articulate the sole 
authoritative body of rules governing lawyers. One method of accom-
plishing this objective might be to supplant legal regulation alto-
gether—or certain domains of lawyering—with non-legal regulation.  
II. 
 If the existing structure of rules expresses a default position of 
low commitment ethics, and if that structure is resistant to change 
because of the political power of the organized bar, giving individual 
lawyers the power to opt into a system of high commitment ethics 
would permit them to make an end-run around the regulatory mo-
nopoly of the bar. As Simon uses these terms, high commitment re-
fers to a principled reluctance or refusal by the lawyer to take an ac-
tion that is unjust, even if legal, and solicitude for the rights of third 
parties.19 The old-fashioned term for high commitment lawyers is “of-
ficers of the court.”20 Low commitment refers to acceptance of the 
dominant view of lawyering, in which the lawyer will take any ar-
guably legal action on behalf of a client.21 The colloquial term for low 
commitment lawyers might be “hired guns.”22 An obvious, but mis-
placed, objection to this proposal might be that self-interested clients 
would never select a high commitment lawyer. Lawyers often claim 
that clients are seeking “attack dog” lawyers, and that market pres-
sures nudge them in the direction of low ethical commitment and a 
                                                                                                                    
 17. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983). 
 18. Macey, supra note 7, at 324-25. 
 19. SIMON, supra note 1, at 204-05; Simon, supra note 3, at 654. 
 20. See, e.g., James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization 
“Officer of the Court”, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349 (2000). 
 21. Simon, supra note 3, at 654. 
 22. See, e.g., W. William Hodes, Rethinking the Way Law Is Taught: Can We Improve 
Lawyer Professionalism by Teaching Hired Guns to Aim Better?, 87 KY. L.J. 1019, 1929 
(1999). 
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“take no prisoners” style of practice.23 Clients don’t care about costs 
inflicted upon third parties, but they do care about prevailing in liti-
gation or obtaining a good deal in a transaction. Why in the world 
would they ever opt for a high commitment lawyer?  
 The response to this objection is twofold. In litigated disputes, 
there are institutional players, such as courts and other tribunals, 
who look after the interests of third parties. These decision makers 
are likely to give more weight to the representations of high com-
mitment than low commitment lawyers, because in their experience, 
high commitment lawyers engage in less tendentious readings of the 
factual record and the law, do not file motions merely to drive up 
their opponents’ costs, and generally urge the court to adopt a posi-
tion that is not grossly inconsistent with the merits of the dispute.24 
There are numerous close calls in pretrial litigation and at trial: mo-
tions that could go either way, discovery disputes in which the ethi-
cal conduct of the parties is an issue that must be decided by the 
judge, evidentiary issues decided on the fly by the judge. Although it 
would be almost impossible to gather empirical proof of this proposi-
tion, it stands to reason that a lawyer who is known for honesty and 
probity in dealing with the tribunal would do better in some of these 
close cases than a low commitment lawyer.25 In business transac-
tions, if the assumption is that everyone is behaving in a self-
interested manner, affected third parties will take costly steps to pro-
tect themselves. If another party in a transaction is dealing with a 
low commitment lawyer, she is likely to demand a thorough “due 
diligence” process or seek other kinds of assurances that the factual 
representations made by the lawyer are accurate, such as an “ex-
                                                                                                                    
 23. Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Cir-
cuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 392-94 (1991); Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of 
Blame: Institutional, Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to Unrea-
sonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
773, 778, 792 (1998); Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and 
Lawyers’ Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 828 
(1998); see, e.g., In re First City Bancorp. of Tex. Inc., 282 F.3d 864, 865 (5th Cir. 2002).  In 
this case, the lawyer got caught and the court affirmed a $25,000 sanction against him, but 
one could imagine the lawyer engaging in a cost-benefit calculation, factoring in court-
imposed sanctions as a cost, discounted for the probability of their imposition.  
 24. Cf. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18-19 
(1998) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege and professional duty of confidentiality 
penalize clients who have nothing to hide, because lawyers for low quality clients can 
mimic the actions of lawyers for high quality clients, making it difficult for judges to differ-
entiate between the two). 
 25. The only things that one could offer as evidence for this claim are the comments 
by judges and lawyers that tend to get made at conferences where civility and professional-
ism is the topic. See, for example, the remarks of Judge Marvin E. Aspen at a panel enti-
tled “The Rambo Litigator,” The Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205, 229 (1992), and the anecdote in 
John A. Humbach, The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An Essay on Honesty, 
“Lawyer Honesty” and Public Trust in the Legal System, 20 PACE L. REV. 93, 97 (1999). 
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press 10(b)-5 warranty” that no material information has been with-
held.26 A party dealing with a high commitment lawyer, on the other 
hand, may be more willing to accept that lawyer’s representations at 
face value, without a lot of duplicative investigation or formal war-
ranty documents.27 In both the litigation and transactional cases, a 
rational client would prefer the high commitment lawyer because 
that lawyer will either maximize the client’s chance of prevailing in 
the litigation or minimize the transaction costs associated with a 
deal. 
 In order for the market to reward high commitment lawyers, 
there must be a means for clients to discover lawyers’ commitment 
levels. The most straightforward method is for the client to have a 
history of dealings with the lawyer, in which they can observe both 
the lawyer’s level of commitment and the response of institutional 
decision makers or transaction partners to that lawyer. In a repeat-
dealing relationship, if the client prefers a high commitment lawyer, 
the lawyer has an incentive to stick to her principles of working for 
her client within the constraints of justice, because she will lose the 
benefit of future employment by the client if she abandons them.28 
Almost as good is a small community of lawyers and clients in which 
all the relevant actors know one another and have ample opportunity 
to verify the commitment levels of others through face-to-face inter-
action. Thus, even if a client has not employed a given lawyer in the 
past, she may have been opposite that lawyer in a transaction or liti-
gated matter, and had a chance to deal extensively with the lawyer. 
Even where the two lawyers have not dealt with one another in the 
past, the length of their professional dealings with one another over 
the course of a discrete matter still provides each lawyer an opportu-
nity to learn about the other’s tendencies and adjust her behavior ac-
cordingly.  
 Lawyers deal with one another in discrete but lengthy interac-
tions that may be modeled as repeated games.29 They face numerous 
opportunities within a single deal or litigated matter to cooperate or 
defect from the cooperative solution, as various small conflicts arise 
                                                                                                                    
 26. SIMON, supra note 1, at 205. 
 27. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and 
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 269-73 (1984). 
 28. In the jargon of law and economics, the lawyer has a “relationship-specific pro-
spective advantage” as a result of a history of dealings with the client, but risks forfeiting 
that advantage by ignoring the client’s wishes for a high commitment lawyer. David 
Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 392-97 
(1990). 
 29. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation 
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 520 (1994); see also 
SIMON, supra note 1, at 66-67, for a recognition of the arms race or prisoner’s dilemma 
structure of adversarial litigation. 
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over issues like scheduling and the logistics of discovery or due dili-
gence. In a typical two-party situation, both lawyers would be better 
off adopting cooperative approaches at the outset, agreeing to rea-
sonable requests for schedule changes, not filing unduly burdensome 
discovery requests or unfairly evading requests, behaving themselves 
at depositions, and so forth.30 Each risks that the other side will ex-
ploit her cooperativeness, however. One response is the familiar 
game theory strategy of “tit-for-tat”: cooperate on the first move, and 
then continue cooperating unless the other player defects, and then 
respond by defecting.31 Litigators report that they sometimes feel out 
their adversaries early in the process, to see if they are inclined to be 
cooperative, for example by “experiment[ing] with minor agreements 
with opposing counsel early in a case to assess whether they could be 
trusted throughout the proceedings.”32 A lawyer’s acquiescence in her 
opponent’s request for an accommodation is in effect a “reputational 
bond,” which secures her right to reciprocal cooperation from the op-
ponent.33 As long as both lawyers cooperate, things operate much 
more smoothly and costs are kept down. If a lawyer gets burned, she 
forfeits the adversary’s bond by refusing to extend reciprocal courte-
sies in exchange, and the litigation becomes more expensive. 
 The information about lawyers’ tendencies to cooperate or defect 
may be pooled within the community of lawyers, through the legal 
press, judicial opinions, social interactions at bar association events 
and CLEs, and other informal gossip networks. A lawyer who has 
earned a reputation for flexibility, reasonableness, and honesty ob-
tains the benefits of reciprocity from adversaries.34 Conversely, ac-
                                                                                                                    
 30. Not all lawyers may perceive this benefit from cooperation and, indeed, some law-
yers may prefer pretrial litigation that is bogged down in extensive motions practice if they 
are billing by the hour. This qualification is supported by the report of some in-house law-
yers, who observe “the economic interest of the hourly fee lawyer to ‘churn’ cases and to 
use discovery disputes to run up fees.” Sarat, supra note 23, at 830; see also Gilson & 
Mnookin, supra note 29, at 516-17. Simon’s reliance on the market to encourage high 
commitment lawyers is thus undermined by the way in which most lawyers bill for their 
services. I am grateful to Andrew Perlman for this point. Note, however, that it is still in 
the interests of each client for the lawyers to cooperate. The problem then becomes design-
ing a mechanism so that clients can learn about the propensities of lawyers to cooperate or 
stir up disputes in order to churn fees and giving them effective and inexpensive sanctions 
to use against lawyers who run up bills. The difficulty in providing this information to po-
tential clients is discussed infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
 31. ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF 
COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 16, 20-21 (1997). 
 32. Nelson, supra note 23, at 776; see also Bartlett H. McGuire, Reflections of a Recov-
ering Litigator: Adversarial Excess in Civil Proceedings, 164 F.R.D. 283, 295 n.44 (1996). 
 33. Charny, supra note 28, at 393. 
 34. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Co-
operation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1756 (2001); 
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 29, at 522-23. Similarly, some firms have acquired reputa-
tions for forthrightness and intolerance of gamesmanship. One example is Wilmer Cutler 
& Pickering, and in particular partner William McLucas, the former head of the SEC’s en-
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quiring a bad reputation may mean that a lawyer’s opponents do not 
play tit-for-tat, but instead start out by assuming that the lawyer 
will be uncooperative.35 This drives up the cost for the client, one rea-
son why Simon is right to argue that clients would prefer a high 
commitment lawyer in many cases.36 Unfortunately for these clients, 
information about a lawyer’s level of ethical commitment may be well 
known by other lawyers, but as a practical matter not accessible to 
clients. It is well understood that individual clients, who are gener-
ally one-shot players within the legal system, have difficulty assess-
ing the competence of lawyers and bargaining over the structure of 
the lawyer-client relationship, as would be required in order to give 
effect to Simon’s proposal to permit clients to select from a menu of 
levels of commitment to which they could hold lawyers.37 Even highly 
sophisticated clients may not be able to tap into the information net-
works used by lawyers, however, particularly if they are not repeat 
players with respect to a particular geographic legal community or 
one defined by a specialized kind of practice. A large manufacturer of 
consumer products, for instance, may get sued in any state, and it is 
unlikely that it could keep adequately informed about the reputation 
of lawyers in each of these locations. Such clients also may have only 
episodic need for lawyers in some subspecialty, like environmental or 
securities law, while making more frequent use of product liability or 
patent lawyers. Perhaps the problem can be addressed by Simon’s 
proposal that lawyers be required to disclose their commitment level 
up front in negotiations with a prospective client,38 but it seems 
unlikely that the organized bar (which is, in Simon’s view, not inter-
ested in ceding any of its authority over professional regulation) will 
require an explicit discussion of commitment levels between lawyers 
and prospective clients. For this reason, highly visible actions that 
function as signals of commitment become even more important.  
 Signaling is a concept from game theory, which assumes that two 
strangers are interested in cooperating in order to achieve gains that 
                                                                                                                    
forcement division. Calling in Wilmer to perform an internal investigation is a strong sig-
nal to outsiders that a corporation is serious about rooting out wrongdoing. Otis Bilodeau, 
What Happened to Mark Belnick?, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at 1, 18. 
 35. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64 (1963). 
 36. There may, of course, be cases in which the client is specifically looking for a low 
commitment lawyer. As Andrew Perlman pointed out, the tobacco industry relied for many 
years on law firms with a reputation for scorched-earth litigation to deter prospective 
plaintiffs from filing lawsuits. Cf. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 29, at 516-17. Simon’s 
market-based response to the professional monopoly would do nothing to ameliorate this 
sort of unethical conduct by lawyers. 
 37. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 114-19 (1974). 
 38. Simon, supra note 3, at 656-57. 
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they could not realize acting alone.39 Each party would like to know 
whether the other is inclined to cooperate, or to defect, if the possibil-
ity exists of realizing a greater gain by cheating than by maintaining 
cooperation. This disposition, however, is private information, not 
subject to verification by third parties. To put it another way, talk is 
cheap, so a low commitment lawyer might induce a client who is in-
terested in the benefits of a high commitment lawyer to hire him, 
merely by professing to be a high commitment lawyer. Although talk 
is cheap, actions are costly, so a high commitment lawyer can take 
the kind of costly action that would be avoided by a low commitment 
lawyer.40 This action is the signal. An example of a signal might be 
joining a law firm with a reputation for probity or an organization 
whose admissions procedures are designed to screen out unethical 
applicants.41 The purpose of signaling is to bring high commitment 
lawyers together with clients who are seeking that type of lawyer 
(call them high commitment clients). High commitment lawyers will 
be able to gain a competitive advantage over their low commitment 
colleagues if the signals are effective and, crucially, if there is a suffi-
cient number of high commitment clients to make it worthwhile to 
invest resources in actions that function as signals. 
 In order to function as a signal, though, an action must be clear 
and unambiguous, as well as difficult to mimic by low commitment 
lawyers. Belonging to Firm X is only a signal of being a high com-
mitment lawyer if Firm X effectively screens out low commitment 
lawyers through its hiring process. Some research suggests that firm 
affiliation is not useful as a signal, because the conduct of lawyers 
within a firm is variable, as well as the actions of the firm in differ-
ent cases.42 It is entirely plausible that Firm X may have two power-
ful partners, H.C. and L.C., who vary in their commitment to lawyer-
ing within Simon’s contextual view, paying due regard to the inter-
ests of third parties. In fact, in the ABA litigation section’s study of 
ethics of large firm litigators, plaintiffs’ lawyers in two cities were 
asked to name the three most and least ethical firms.43 The result 
was “only weak convergence,” with a wide disparity of votes, and 
some firms even appearing on both lists.44 As one of the study au-
thors concludes, firms may have reputations for litigation style, but 
                                                                                                                    
 39. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 122-42 (1994); Edward 
Rock & Michael Wachter, Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms: Complementary Ac-
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 40. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19-22 (2000). 
 41. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1765. 
 42. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 29, at 557; see also John K. Setear, The Barris-
ter and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 
69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 617-19 (1989). 
 43. Nelson, supra note 23, at 796-97. 
 44. Id. 
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these reputations can vary across cases.45 The same may be true for 
voluntary associations such as the American Academy of Matrimo-
nial Lawyers, particularly if they do not sanction members for violat-
ing their high commitment standards. A member of the Academy 
may be a high commitment lawyer or a low commitment lawyer, but 
the fact of membership alone does not provide the necessary informa-
tion.46 Contrast organizations like the cotton shippers’ associations, 
who expel members for refusing to comply with arbitration awards,47 
or the trade associations who employ voting procedures and member-
ship criteria designed to weed out untrustworthy applicants.48 Con-
tinuing membership in one of these associations is a signal at least of 
the willingness of the member to abide by the organization’s dispute-
resolution procedures, which in effect means assent to a substantial 
body of trade norms and practices of fair dealing. The organizations 
Simon mentions, however, do not screen out low commitment appli-
cants or sanction low commitment members,49 so low commitment 
lawyers may join in the hopes of duping high commitment clients 
into retaining them. The value of membership as a signal is consid-
erably reduced if it does not enable the creation of a separating equi-
librium in the market for legal services, in which high commitment 
lawyers and clients match up only with one another, and do not in-
advertently match up with those of low commitment.50 
 The discussion of signaling points in the direction of a significant 
complexity elided in the Lecture, namely the definition of a “high 
commitment” to ethics. This is certainly not the place to re-enter the 
                                                                                                                    
 45. Id. at 797. 
 46. Simon reports that the Academy does not sanction members for violating their 
ethical commitments, although it could. SIMON, supra note 1, at 197. The Academy’s by-
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cumbersome proceedings. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1760-61; Charny, supra note 28, 
at 404-05. 
 47. Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1737-38. 
 48. Id. at 1765. 
 49. Simon, supra note 3, at 658. 
 50. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 19-20. 
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debate over the extent to which the lawyer’s role should take account 
of the justice of the client’s position, the merits of the case, or the ef-
fect of the representation on third parties. Although I have a some-
what different view about the nature of the lawyer’s obligation to the 
law and am not as enthusiastic a proponent of nullification as 
Simon,51 I do agree that the lawyer’s moral agency requires in some 
cases that she either seek to persuade the client to change her posi-
tion, withdraw, or accept moral responsibility for harms caused by 
the client. The problem is that this approach, at best, serves only one 
of several competing views within the academic legal ethics commu-
nity,52 and is decidedly a minority view among practicing lawyers. 
Simon does not call his rhetorical adversary the “dominant” view for 
nothing. Given the prevalence of the dominant view, it would not be 
surprising to learn that many lawyers and law firms proclaim their 
commitment to ethics in the sense of zealous client service. Perhaps 
this is only a problem of labels, which could be solved by clarifying 
our terms, but I fear that making ethical commitment the basis of 
reputational markets and signaling behavior will only lead to confu-
sion. For example, what is the “high commitment” response to the 
following cases?  
 (1) The defendant’s lawyer files a request for an extension of 
time to answer a complaint, but through a clerical error it is misdi-
rected. The plaintiff’s lawyer, knowing of the mistake, has the op-
portunity to file a motion for a default judgment.53 Does she do it?  
 (2) In a product liability case, the defendant’s lawyers define 
the terms in a discovery request narrowly, to avoid producing an 
inculpatory document. The plaintiffs do not object or file a motion 
to compel.54 Is the defense lawyer’s conduct proper? 
 (3) A defendant is charged with armed robbery and has admit-
ted the crime to his lawyer. At the preliminary hearing the victim 
testified that the crime took place at midnight, when the defen-
dant was (truthfully) playing cards with three friends, all of whom 
have a good reputation in the community and will probably be be-
                                                                                                                    
 51. Cf. William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular Culture, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 421 (2001). 
 52. For powerful moral arguments that lawyers are permitted or required to take all 
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 53. Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Mo. 1989). 
 54. A slight modification on the facts of Washington State Physicians Insurance 
Exchange & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993). 
2003]                  BUSTING THE PROFESSIONAL TRUST 671 
 
lieved by the jury.55 Unfortunately, the victim was mixed up on the 
time, probably because the defendant had hit him on the head in 
the course of the robbery. (The crime actually occurred at 2:00 
a.m.) The defendant is not going to take the stand. May the lawyer 
call the friends to testify about the card game? 
 (4) A man whose lifelong dream has been to run a 
restaurant persuades a millionaire cousin to lend him $100,000; 
the man signs a demand note to the cousin. The restaurant is a 
spectacular success, so the conniving cousin immediately calls the 
note and brings an action on it, intending to acquire the restaurant 
in a foreclosure sale. The man goes to a lawyer who, seeing little in 
the way of defense on the merits, files a series of dilatory motions 
to give the cousin time to pay back the note from revenues from 
the restaurant. The motions are not frivolous in the Rule 11 sense, 
but they are extremely unlikely to affect the result on the merits. 
Is this a high commitment or low commitment stance with respect 
to ethics? 
 Does the answer change if the client is a construction company 
whose falling debris injured a single mother of three children who 
worked as a housekeeper and is now permanently disabled, and 
where the delay will put pressure on the plaintiff to settle early 
and cheaply?56 
 Because the boundaries of the relevant context are contestable, I 
suspect that there would be little convergence on a single answer to 
each of these cases, even among lawyers who accept the basic out-
lines of the contextual view.57 Thus, high commitment lawyers would 
have to figure out a way not only to signal that they “take ethics seri-
ously,” but that their understanding of ethics has a particular result 
in a given case, which matches up with their prospective clients’ un-
derstanding.58 Again, I do not think it is implausible that a lawyer or 
law firm might find this approach desirable, but to the extent 
Simon’s proposals depend on information sharing, reputation, signal-
ing, and decentralized mechanisms of enforcement, clarity is of the 
essence. Transaction costs would become prohibitive if lawyers and 
prospective clients had to introduce all the relevant contextual fac-
tors into a discussion of ethical commitment levels. 
                                                                                                                    
 55. See Mich. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Informal Op. CI-1164 (1987), available at 
http://www.michbar.org (last visited Jan. 12, 2003) (on file with Florida State University 
Law Review). 
 56. These hypotheticals are taken from Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer Be a Bad 
Person?, 2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 131, 136-37 (1999). 
 57. Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Ob-
servations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 712-13 (1998) (stating that because ethical evaluation 
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 58. Simon does acknowledge that the lawyer and prospective client would need to 
flesh out what it means for the lawyer to promise to adhere to the “highest ethical stan-
dards.” Simon, supra note 3, at 655. I think he is correct to worry about the effect of this in-
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about the institutional means for alleviating the problem. 
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 A committed contextualist client with sufficient bargaining power 
could always structure the attorney-client relationship contractually, 
so that the lawyer would be obligated to act in the interests of justice. 
Because of the difficulty in specifying what it means to practice con-
textually, or in the interests of justice, the transaction costs involved 
in this kind of approach appear daunting. However, Simon responds, 
in his book and in the Lecture, that this obstacle could be sur-
mounted if lawyers and clients had a diverse stock of ethics rules 
from which to choose.59 Often, nonlegal mechanisms of regulation of-
fer transaction-cost savings as compared with the legal system,60 but 
Simon is right to point out that institutional actors can nevertheless 
play a role in the process of decentralized regulation by, for example, 
providing a menu of contract provisions that parties may incorporate 
into their agreements.61 There is no particular reason to suppose that 
this menu must take the form of state disciplinary rules developed 
under a regime of competitive federalism—voluntary associations 
could perform the drafting function—although authoritative groups 
like the organized bar do have the salutary effect of collectivizing the 
costs of this project, preventing free-riding.62 The problem with this 
proposal is still disseminating the relevant information throughout 
the pool of prospective clients. Even assuming there is a substantial 
population of high commitment clients who are not seeking “attack 
dog” lawyers, they still must be educated that they can demand a 
high commitment lawyer, and that there are standardized provisions 
governing the lawyer’s conduct that they can insist be inserted in re-
tainer agreements.63 This education campaign would be expensive, so 
only organized groups would be able to fund it, again because of free-
rider problems that would make collective action by individual high 
commitment lawyers difficult. The dilemma for Simon, therefore, is 
that the only actors in the market for legal services who are capable 
of solving the problem of the organized bar’s corruption are exactly 
those actors who are alleged to be corrupt. The grassroots activism of 
high commitment lawyers and clients risks being swamped by the 
“noise” in the market created by the dominance of low commitment 
actors.  
 Finally, the contexts in which reputational markets and informal 
sanctions have shown promise are those in which there are a large 
number of potential transactors and the interactions between them 
                                                                                                                    
 59. SIMON, supra note 1, at 207-08; Simon, supra note 3, at 657. 
 60. See, e.g., Charny, supra note 28, at 403-08; Macaulay, supra note 35, at 63-65. 
 61. Simon, supra note 3, at 656. 
 62. Bernstein, supra note 34, at 1742-43; Charny, supra note 28, at 412. 
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are entirely voluntary. Lisa Bernstein has produced richly detailed 
studies of nonlegal regulation in the diamond and cotton industries,64 
and in both cases, there are enough buyers and sellers that it is rela-
tively costless to avoid doing business with someone in the industry 
who has a bad reputation. There are significant differences in the 
market for legal services. Most lawyer-lawyer relationships are not 
voluntary at all. A plaintiff’s lawyer cannot avoid suing the entity re-
sponsible for her client’s injury just because it is represented by the 
Low Commitment Law Firm. The only thing the lawyer can do in 
that case is protect herself by not attempting to cooperate early in 
the relationship.  But this only protects the client from the costs of 
having her lawyer’s cooperation exploited at some later time in the 
lawsuit, not from the greater costs of the lawyers’ inability to cooper-
ate from the outset. A larger number of client-lawyer relationships 
are voluntary, at least in some areas of practice, like commercial liti-
gation and criminal defense, although there are some highly special-
ized practices in which an oligopolistic market for lawyers’ services 
exists. With respect to one-shot litigants, however, the episodic na-
ture of their interaction with lawyers and the social differentiation of 
these populations of lawyers and clients make it extremely difficult 
to acquire the information necessary to seek out high commitment 
lawyers (if that is their desire) and to structure the legal relationship 
with their lawyer accordingly.65 
III. 
 Simon worries very much about the corruption of formal entities 
such as the organized bar, which is beholden to its economically self-
interested members. The dismal record of the state bar associations 
in controlling unethical behavior by lawyers is almost taken for 
granted, and there seems to be no reason to quarrel with Simon’s as-
sessment on this point.66 Despite powerful critiques by Simon and 
others,67 lawyers as a whole do not seem terribly interested in finding 
an alternative to the dominant view, in which they can sell zealous 
advocacy to clients and rest easy that they will not be held morally 
accountable for their clients’ ends. Nevertheless, the hope expressed 
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in Simon’s Lecture is that nonlegal regulation will be less susceptible 
to capture by lawyers who are not committed to practicing law in the 
interests of justice. At the risk of sounding an unduly pessimistic 
note on this hopeful occasion, I wonder whether the informal, non-
state-centered mechanisms he favors are any more insulated from 
the pressures of lawyer self-interest than the formal, monopolistic, 
profession-based regulatory regime he attacks.  
 The reason for this pessimism is not related only to the persis-
tence of the dominant view, the hired gun ethic, the ideology of advo-
cacy, or whatever one wants to call it, among practicing lawyers. 
Rather, Simon’s alternative is vulnerable to capture by self-
interested lawyers by reason of the structure of its enforcement 
mechanism. As noted above, reputational markets, gossip, informal 
means of retaliation, and decentralized control mechanisms work 
better among parties who are repeat players with respect to each 
other. In a small town, all the lawyers may have incentives to coop-
erate with one another;68 in larger cities there may at least be spe-
cialized bars in which lawyers follow norms of reciprocal fair dealing 
with each other.69 The situation becomes more complicated when we 
introduce the lawyer-client relationship. A lawyer may be a repeat 
player with respect to judges and other lawyers, but only a one-shot 
player with respect to the client. In addition, the client may herself 
be only a one-shot player with respect to the litigation system.70 This 
asymmetry gives rise to a “confidence game” structure, in which the 
lawyer’s primary loyalty is to other institutional players, who assist 
her in duping the client into believing that the client is receiving 
zealous representation.71 As Marc Galanter puts it, the “real” clien-
tele of a lawyer who represents individuals who have only episodic 
contact with the legal system are the other institutional actors.72 
Good relationships among, for example, criminal defense attorneys, 
prosecutors, judges, and court personnel such as clerks and bailiffs, 
are essential in order to facilitate the resolution of cases through 
plea-bargaining.73 Furthermore, in order to do well in her own career, 
a defense lawyer must have access to courthouse personnel who can 
cut her client breaks. By obtaining this access, the defense lawyer 
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becomes a “fixer” who has a valuable commodity—access—to sell to 
clients.74 
 A profound tension thus exists between the procedural entitle-
ments of the client and the systemic interest in the efficient process-
ing of cases. To put it unkindly, criminal defense lawyers sell out 
some of their clients in the interests of procedural justice and of long-
term economic success. To make the same point more sympatheti-
cally, if each client received what he was entitled to under law—a 
full, adversarial trial on the merits—the machinery of criminal jus-
tice would grind to a halt. As officers of the court, lawyers have some 
obligation to facilitate the fair and efficient processing of disputes. 
The alternative to accepting some of this responsibility is the ethic of 
zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law that Simon decries. 
After all, the reason he criticizes lawyers who take formally non-
frivolous but substantively unwarranted legal positions is that they 
are neglecting their responsibility to facilitate the just resolution of 
disputes.75 It may be objected, of course, that a lawyer in Simon’s 
contextual view is not permitted to “sell out” her client’s interests 
merely to enhance the lawyer’s reputation with other courthouse 
regulars. We need not take this uncharitable view of settlement in all 
cases, however. Some settlements may be just, if they are calibrated 
to the value of the plaintiff’s claims, discounted for the probability of 
a defense verdict at trial.76 Moreover, Simon explicitly includes the 
effective functioning of the system within his definition of justice, 
and charges contextualist lawyers with making the procedural appa-
ratus as efficient as possible, consistent with deciding cases on the 
legal merits.77 
 To the extent that this Lecture can be understood as a brief for 
shifting some of the responsibility for regulating the profession onto 
nonlegal mechanisms, the problem noticed by Blumberg becomes 
more acute. Simon argues that reputational markets should encour-
age lawyers to increase their level of ethical commitment, because 
clients would seek a high commitment lawyer over an attack dog in 
order to benefit from the lawyer’s good reputation.78 In litigation, one 
way to acquire a good reputation is to acquiesce to reasonable re-
quests by opposing counsel, not annoy judges unduly, and generally 
refrain from rocking the boat. “[A] tribunal might reward lawyers 
who appear to adhere to high-commitment ethics with procedural ac-
commodation or more ready acceptance of their representations.”79 
                                                                                                                    
 74. Id. at 25-26. 
 75. SIMON, supra note 1, at 140-41. 
 76. Id. at 141. 
 77. Id. at 143. 
 78. Simon, supra note 3, at 651-52. 
 79. SIMON, supra note 1, at 205. 
676  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:659 
 
Everything works beautifully if the judge, other lawyers, and as-
sorted courthouse regulars, like clerks, are interested in doing jus-
tice, in the sense of deciding cases on their merits. The trouble is that 
the tribunal and all the supporting players may be no more inter-
ested in justice than the dominant-view lawyers Simon criticizes. Or, 
to put the point less harshly, other institutional actors may act under 
a Weberian, bureaucratic conception of justice, emphasizing docket-
clearing, expeditious handling of cases through settlements and plea 
bargains, and efficiency rather than resolution of cases after careful 
consideration of the parties’ factual and legal contentions.80 In such a 
system, lawyers’ incentives would be largely as Blumberg described 
them—to contribute to the realization of administrative values such 
as the saving of cost, time, and labor.81 
 In The Practice of Justice, Simon recognizes the alienating effect 
that the rationalization of professional practice through categorical 
norms of ethics has on lawyers,82 and argues for the contextual view 
as a way of returning meaning to lawyers’ work. By vesting lawyers 
with the autonomy to make flexible, substantive decisions regarding 
the application of law to their clients’ cases, the contextual view re-
turns artisanal values like personalization, judgment, and craft (i.e. 
non-fungibility of one’s work product) to the practice of law, as well 
as connecting lawyers’ lives more directly with the pursuit of social 
justice.83 His diagnosis of alienation is perceptive, and he may be 
right to look to the idealism of law students and young lawyers as a 
source of hope for the renewal of the profession’s aspirations. As 
noted at the outset, however, this idealism makes an uncomfortable 
fit with enforcement mechanisms that depend so critically on the 
reputation of lawyers within the professional community. If profes-
sional norms become differentiated into low commitment and high 
commitment, the only way to avoid a race to the bottom is to make 
high commitment strategies more beneficial to clients, which in turn 
is plausible only if the consequences of adopting a low level of ethical 
commitment are visited on the clients. Unfortunately, the most likely 
mechanism for creating this feedback effect creates divided loyalties 
on the part of lawyers, who must please other institutional actors 
whose commitments may not be to substantive justice. This means 
that the lawyer may have an incentive to sell out the short-run inter-
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ests of one client in favor of her own long-run interests in maintain-
ing good relationships with the other actors.  
 Perhaps I am exaggerating the problem because I have unwit-
tingly subscribed to the dominant view position that the lawyer 
ought to be primarily loyal to her client, not to the system of justice 
generally.84 One person’s “double agent”85 is another’s Brandeisian 
lawyer for the situation.86 Nothing in Simon’s Lecture is inconsistent 
with the ideal of loyal client service. His point is rather that a lawyer 
provides better client service by realizing that opposing counsel and 
courts are interested in achieving a cooperative solution to various 
problems, such as discovery abuse and misrepresentations in nego-
tiation, and assuming a cooperative posture with respect to these 
other institutional players. I do think, though, that the tension be-
tween procedural and substantive justice is not likely to go away if 
the professional monopoly is dissolved. The market, no less than the 
organized bar, is a rough instrument for regulating lawyers’ behav-
ior. Simon’s categorical view is a response to the tension between 
procedural and substantive justice, and he envisions trade-offs be-
tween the two conceptions of justice as the merits of a particular rep-
resentation require.87 Precisely because legal ethics is so contextual, 
these subtle distinctions cannot be translated into clear, unambigu-
ous signals of a lawyer’s level of ethical commitment, which can be 
used by participants in the market for legal services. In the end, 
Simon may not be able to have it both ways, with a flexible, contex-
tual, case-by-case approach to lawyers’ ethics and an enforcement 
mechanism that depends on clarity and the absence of ambiguity. 
 Depending on one’s attitude toward the rhetoric of professional-
ism, whether one regards it as self-serving window dressing or as 
genuine ideals to which lawyers ought to respond, Simon’s embrace 
of nonlegal regulation is either regrettable or welcome. Authentically 
high commitment lawyers presumably adopt this level of commit-
ment because they believe it is morally obligatory, not because they 
believe it will help them attract clients. On the other hand, even 
morally ambitious lawyers have to eat and pay the mortgage, and it 
would be comforting for them to expect that their ethical commit-
ments will not result in losing a race to the bottom. There is a long 
tradition in moral philosophy of trying to show that doing the right 
thing is ultimately conducive to one’s happiness. This Lecture at-
tempts to show that the marketplace will encourage a race to the top, 
                                                                                                                    
 84. See generally William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and 
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29 (arguing that even critics of the adversary sys-
tem tend to accept the ideology of advocacy without question). 
 85. Blumberg, supra note 71, at 39. 
 86. SIMON, supra note 1, at 127-32. 
 87. Id. at 139-40. 
678  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:659 
 
if only it could be freed from the strictures of the organized bar’s low 
commitment rules. It is an extremely ambitious and hopeful, but not 
utopian, claim. Simon does not think we are all angels, only that our 
self-interested natures may drive us in the direction of beneficial co-
operation.88 A reader looking for more idealism will be disappointed 
in this stance, but what we know about lawyers’ ethics in practice 
suggests that any serious proposals for reform will have to contend 
with the pervasiveness of self-interest and the erosion of professional 
ideals.89 If morality is all about striking the appropriate balance be-
tween values, then Simon is to be commended for recognizing the 
balancing act inherent in professional regulation, and offering a pro-
posal for reform that attempts to get it right. 
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